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SUPERANNUATION CHOICE:  THE 
PIVOTAL ROLE OF THE DEFAULT OPTION  
Gerry Gallery, Natalie Gallery and Kerry Brown 
A controversial global trend in defined contribution pension1 plans is the 
introduction and expansion of investment choice to plan members. The 
international experience with investment choice offers no clear direction 
on an appropriate choice model. Similarly in Australia, an extensive and 
long-running policy debate on an appropriate superannuation choice 
model remains unresolved.2 Seeking to increase competitive forces 
within a rapidly growing superannuation industry, the Federal Coalition 
government has repeatedly attempted to implement its 1996 pre-election 
promise to enact legislation allowing superannuation fund members to 
choose their superannuation fund. Those attempts have been 
unsuccessful to date due to its failure to build consensus with opposition 
parties and within the superannuation industry. The principle of choice is 
generally supported but there is considerable disagreement among policy 
makers about the form of the choice model and implementation issues 
(see Senate Select Committee on Superannuation (SSCS) 2002).  
Meanwhile, a quiet revolution has occurred in the superannuation 
industry. Increasing numbers of superannuation funds are offering their 
members within-fund investment choice, with about 80 percent of 
                                                          
1 The term ‘pension’ is used in the U.S. and other countries to refer to employment-
related retirement benefits whereas the term ‘superannuation’ is generally used in 
Australia.
2 While the debate continues, superannuation investments in Australia are becoming 
increasingly important from economic and social perspectives as a result of 
compulsory superannuation. Assets in superannuation funds total $534 billion 
covering 88 per cent of the workforce with over 25 million accounts (APRA, June 
2003) held by 9 million fund members – an average of 2.8 accounts per employee.   
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individuals in defined contribution (accumulation-style) plans reported to
now have some choice in how the assets in their accounts are invested
(see Bowman 2003; Hely 2004). This expansion of investment choice in
the Australian superannuation industry is in step with a world-wide trend 
of pension plan members in other countries being given greater choice
and control over the decision-making in relation to how their pension
assets are invested.3
The global move towards choice is founded on the traditional economic
assumption that well informed economic agents act rationally to
maximise their self-interests. Investment choice enables plan members to 
select their optimal investment portfolio that matches their risk and 
return preferences and ultimately, maximises retirement incomes.
However, recent behavioural research has challenged the traditional
view, arguing a form of ‘bounded rationality’ is observed in practice.
When plan participants face complex decisions required to make
investment choice, inertia or procrastination affects their decisions,
leading to sub-optimal choices (Choi, Laibson, Madrian & Metrick 2003;
Madrian & Shea 2001; Mitchell & Utkus 2003).
These findings have implications for the current and proposed ‘choice
framework’ in Australia. In particular, the findings that many plan
participants are unable to make effective choices, even after undertaking
education programs, highlights the need to ensure that appropriate
default options are provided in superannuation funds. However, to date,
the choice debate has focused on expanding education programs,
reducing fees and determining the number and types of choices. The role
of the default option is considered a second order issue in this debate,
merely relegated to the same status as another investment option in a
portfolio of investment and fund choices. In this paper we address this
shortcoming by calling for a renewed focus on default options in
superannuation plan design, drawing on the considerable evidence
emerging from behavioural research. We first provide an overview of the
choice debate in Australia and identify the role the default option has
3 A survey by Mercer Human Resource Consulting shows 81 percent of defined
contribution (DC) pension funds in the U.K. and 99 percent of DC funds in the
U.S. offer investment choice (Walker 2003).
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played in that debate. We then review behavioural research findings and
discuss the implications for the default option. The diversity in current
medium-term investment performance of best performing Australian
default options is then evaluated. We conclude with a discussion of the
key issues policy-makers need to consider in addressing the inadequacies
in the current default offerings in Australian superannuation plans.
The Superannuation Choice Debate and the Emerging 
Importance of the Default Option 
While investment in superannuation grew rapidly following the
introduction of compulsory superannuation in 1992,4 most funds offered
few investments alternatives to fund members and these alternatives were
usually confined to one fund (Brown, Gallery & Gallery 2002). Attempts
to regulate investment choice to require funds to offer a wider selection
of investments in more than one fund arose in the mid-1990s. In a pre-
1996 election promise, the Federal Coalition announced that it would
enact legislation requiring all awards and workplace agreements to offer
workers a choice of investments in up to five superannuation funds.  The
Government provided the following justification:
… providing individual employees with choice will increase
competition and efficiency in the superannuation industry,
leading to improved returns on superannuation savings and 
placing downward pressure on fund administration charges
(SSCS 2002, p. 2).
Consistent with their pre-election policy statement, the 1997-78 Budget
contained proposals for superannuation fund choice. A controversial part
of this policy required an employer to nominate a default fund if an 
employee failed to make an election. Following release of the policy,
employers expressed concerns about ‘… their potential liability if they
failed to provide sufficient or accurate information to their employees
under the limited choice option, or if the funds they selected to offer to
4 The amount of superannuation fund assets was $154 billion at June 1992, growing
to $534 billion at June 2003 (APRA 2003).
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employees performed badly’ (SSCS 2002, p. 5). In response to these
concerns, changes to the policy were announced in late 1997, including
the addition of an option to offer unlimited employee choice and a 
reduction in the number of fund choices from five to four under the
limited choice option.
Notably, when the Government first attempted to implement its choice of 
fund policy through the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (No 7) 1997, it
included only the limited choice option. The choice of fund provisions
were removed from that Bill in the Senate and re-introduced in the
separate Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice of
Superannuation Funds) Bill 1998; the 1998 Bill made provision for 
unlimited fund choice. Changes to the default fund arrangements were
also made in the 1998 Bill. Rather than employers choosing the default
fund, the default fund would become the industrial award fund for the
employee, or if there was no such award fund, the ‘majority fund’ in the
workplace. If neither of such funds was available, then the employer
would be responsible for selecting the default fund. In December 1999
the provisions of the 1998 Bill were debated by superannuation industry
representatives and others at a roundtable hosted by the Senate Select
Committee on Superannaution and Financial Services (SSCSFS). The
Committee’s report (SSCSFS, 2000) concluded that the majority of
participants favoured unlimited choice and the relevant award fund as the
default fund. The Bill was debated in the Senate but was finally defeated
in August 2001.5
The Government attempted to legislate for superannuation fund choice
for a third time in June 2002 with the introduction of the Superannuation
Legislation Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) Bill 2002 to 
the House of Representatives. The provisions of this iteration of the
proposed legislation are essentially the same as in the 1998 Bill in
relation to proposing unlimited choice of fund, and nominating the
default option as the industry award fund for the employee or, in the
absence of such a fund, the majority fund for the workplace, and if 
5 The bill ultimately failed on the vote of the Democrats who supported the choice 
bill but sought a trade-off on another unrelated matter with the Government. The 
Government rejected the ‘deal’ and consequently the Democrats voted against the
choice bill (Gallery 2002).
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neither of these is available, then the default fund would be selected by
the employer. In May 2003, the Government announced amendments to
the 2002 Bill (see Coonan 2003), which include dropping the three-step
approach that employers would have had to follow and instead retaining
the status quo. That is, the process of selecting a default option under the
choice regime would be the same as current practice under 
superannuation guarantee legislation where employers contribute to a
fund determined by the relevant industrial award, and if there is no such
fund, the employer selects any complying superannuation fund. The
Government reverted to this simpler process in response to objections
that the three-step approach would be too costly for business.6 The 
amended Bill was passed by the House of Representatives on 4
December 2003 and the Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice
of Funds) Bill 2003 was introduced to the Senate on 10 February 2004;
debate on the Bill was adjourned that day and has not recommenced at 
the date of writing.
During the past eight years the Government has three times attempted to
enact choice of superannuation fund legislation, but has not yet gained
the necessary support to implement its proposals. Choice of fund was
extensively debated within and outside Parliament, including two Senate
Committee enquiries (see SSCS 1998 and 2002) and a roundtable
discussion (see SSCSFS 2000), all of which involved extensive
consultation with superannuation industry leaders and other interested
parties. Despite this consultation and wide-ranging debate, consensus has
not been achieved. The concept of choice of fund per se is not in dispute
– it is generally viewed as desirable by non-government political parties,
the superannuation industry and consumer groups. One of the major
points of contention relates to a perceived absence of adequate consumer
protection measures. In their review of the 2002 Bill, the Senate
Committee expressed support for the Bill, providing the government
appropriately addressed the issues raised in their report (SSCS 2002),
which principally relate to strengthening consumer protection. Two
major aspects of consumer protection highlighted by the Committee are 
6 See the Parliamentary Debate on the Superannuation Legislation Amendment
(Choice of Funds) Bill 2002, House of Representatives Hansard, 4 December
2003.
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consumer education and improved disclosure regulation. In 
supplementary statements to the majority report, the Democrats and 
Labor members of the Committee reiterated their demands for better
consumer protection measures in return for their support for the 
proposals (see SSCS 2002, pp. 85-92). Some amendments were made to 
the 2002 Bill in response to the Senate Committee’s report before it was 
introduced to parliament. However, those changes were viewed as
inadequate by the Labor Party and accordingly they opposed passage of
the Bill on the basis that it will ‘introduce unsafe choice’ because inter
alia, it does not adequately address significant disclosure issues, does not
regulate fees and charges, and does not provide for a ‘comprehensive and
effective consumer education campaign’ (see House of Representatives
Hansard, 4 December 2003, p. 23914).7
Throughout the choice of fund debate, considerable attention has
focussed on consumer education and disclosure as essential
preconditions of informed choice. Considerably less attention has been
given to the default option, with primary consideration given to
establishing a process for selecting a default fund that will minimise
costs to employers rather than necessarily ensuring the default option is 
the ‘best’ alternative for employees who do not exercise choice.
While the choice of fund debate has been raging at the policy-making
level, a ‘choice by stealth’ phenomenon in the superannuation industry is
evident. About 80 percent of all superannuation fund members are now 
offered some choice of how the assets in their accounts are invested (see
Bowman 2003; Hely 2004). Hence, even in the absence of choice of fund
regulation, the adequacy of the choices presently offered by
superannuation funds to their members needs policy-makers’ attention.
In particular, policy attention to the default option is critically important
given that where members are offered investment choice, the vast
7 In November 2003 the Labor Party released Policy Paper 015 Superannuation: A
Simpler System, stating that Labor will introduce ‘safe’ choice of fund. Apart from
a statement that their safe choice regime will require ‘clear disclosure of all fees,
charges and commissions’ and members switching funds will be required to sign a
standard option form which sets out comparisons of fund fees/charges and 
investment returns (p.13), details are not provided on how safe choice will be 
achieved; the policy paper states further details will be set out in a future policy 
document.
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majority do not exercise choice and are automatically assigned the
default investment option. The Association of Superannuation Funds of
Australia (ASFA), the peak superannuation industry body, reports that
only about 10 percent of members offered investment choice actually
make a choice (see Bowman 2003a).
Important questions that have received little attention are: Is there
evidence that fund members exercise informed choice when given the
opportunity? and, are the choices and default options offered appropriate
in meeting individual members needs? We explore these questions in the
next section in the context of the findings of behavioural research.
Implications of Behavioural Research Findings for 
Default Options
A basic principle of economic theory is that, in the absence of decision-
making costs, expanding the choice set cannot make a consumer worse
off. So where financial stakes are high and choices are made
infrequently, it could be argued that more choices are ‘unambiguously a 
good thing’ (Benartzi & Thaler 2002, p. 1593). However, as the number
of investment options increases, the associated administration costs 
increase and the costs associated with sub-optimal investment choices
also increase (Benartzi & Thaler 2002). The costs arising from sub-
optimal investing have been attributed to various behavioural factors
including choice overload, unstable preferences and investment menu
design, procrastination and inertia, and limitations of member eduction
programs.
The Problem of Choice Overload
An often-cited experiment used to illustrate the impact of excessive
choice (choice overload) is documented by Iyengar and Lepper (2000).8
In their experiment they set up two alternative booths in a grocery store
8 For a recent citation in the Australian press see Dunstan (2003).
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with one selling six flavours of jam and the other 24 flavours. While
sixty percent of shoppers stopped at the booth with 24 jam flavours and
forty percent at the other booth, only three percent of shoppers purchased
jam from the extensive-choice booth, whereas 30 percent bought jam at 
the booth where the choice was limited to six options. From this
experiment, they conclude that consumers may in fact desire fewer
choices. There is some evidence that these findings translate to
investment choice in retirement plans. For example, in a study of
participation rates in U.S. 401 (k) pension plans, Iyengar, Jiang and
Huberman (2003) found that participation rates decline as the number of 
fund options increases.9
In an attempt to more specifically test participants’ perceptions of 
investment choice, Benartzi and Thaler (2002) conducted two related
experiments. In the first experiment investors were asked to rate the
attractiveness of three unlabeled investment portfolios: one is the
portfolio of investments that the investor had selected previously, the
second portfolio is the average portfolio for all members of the pension
plan, and the third is the median portfolio for the whole group. When
asked which investment portfolio they considered the most attractive,
participants rated the average portfolio about equal to their own, but
surprisingly, indicated a preference for the median portfolio over their
own.
While the first experiment involved participants who were forced to 
make investment choices, Benartzi and Thaler’s (2002) second
experiment investigates the preferences of plan participants who have the
option of allowing an investment manager to choose a portfolio for them.
Their sample comprised individuals who had opted to construct their
own portfolio rather than the portfolio picked by the investment manager.
Participants were asked to rate three portfolios comprising the
individual’s own portfolio, an average portfolio for all members in the
pension plan, and the portfolio selected for them by the investment
management firm. The results show that 61 percent of participants
9 In the U.S., 401(k) plans are employer-based retirement savings plans to which
individuals voluntarily contribute from their pre-tax earnings; members generally
have investment choice.
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indicated a preference for the portfolio selected by the investment
manager while only 21 percent preferred the portfolio they had selected
themselves.
What might explain the incongruity between individuals freely selecting
an investment portfolio and then indicating a preference for other
available portfolios which they did not select? Benartzi and Thaler (2002, 
p. 1595) suggest most participants do not have stable, well-defined
preferences in that they ‘simply do not have the skills and/or information
available to pick portfolios that line up with their risk attitudes’.
Constructing a well-diversified portfolio that fits personal preferences is 
a complex task and therefore it is not surprising that pension plan
members who elected to choose their own investments seemed to have
difficulty with making selections to match their preferences (Benartzi
and Thaler 2002).
The Problems of Unstable Preferences and Investment Menu Design
Although retirement plan participants perceive a need to maximise
retirement income, they are likely to have difficulty coping with a large
number of investment alternatives and the complex decisions involved in
investment choice.10 Even if the range of choices is limited, the problem
of ‘incoherent’ preferences complicates optimal retirement plan design
(Benartzi and Thaler 2002). This situation is further exacerbated by the
nature of the investment menu offered by plan sponsors.11 For many plan
participants, a default heuristic is likely to be viewed as an easy option.
To test how plan participants are influenced by menu choice, Benartzi
and Thaler (2001) conducted an experiment in which participants were 
offered a choice of two investment options (an equity and bond fund, an
10 Benartzi and Thaler (2002) in borrowing from Simon (1955) refer to this problem
as ‘bounded rationality’.
11 Mitchell and Utkus (2003, p. 15) refer to behavioural problems arising from
investment menu design as ‘framing effects’:  ‘The investment menu in a
retirement plan is an “opaque frame”, which most participants cannot see through
to understand the underlying risk and return characteristics of the investments
being offered.’
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equity and balanced fund, or a bond and balanced fund). In all cases, a
common participant allocation choice was a 50/50 mix of the two funds.
When the choice was increased to five funds, a similar naïve investment
strategy was observed. Plan participants tended to allocate equal amounts
across the portfolio of choices regardless of the asset type that dominated
the plan (i.e. they loaded up on equity funds if the plan was loaded up on
equity funds, etc). This behavioural response to portfolio selection is 
often referred to as the ‘1/n Rule’ (Benartzi & Thaler 2001; Liang &
Weisbenner 2002; Elton, Gruber & Blake 2004) and appears to be
consistent with the observed behaviour of many participants in U.S.
401(k) plans (Liang & Weisbenner, 2002).
In a follow-up study, Benartzi and Thaler (2002) test ‘extremeness
aversion’ by designing an experiment where the same investment
portfolio (C) is placed as either the middle choice or extreme choice in
sets of portfolios drawn from four choices (A, B, C and D), with an
increasing level of risk moving from A to D. They find that when
portfolio C was placed as an extreme choice (in the set A, B and C), 29.2
percent of participants preferred C to B, but when C was the middle
choice (in the set B, C and D), 53.8 percent indicated a preference for C 
over B. Thus when faced with an array of balanced funds with varying 
risk levels, some plan participants are likely to be attracted to the middle
fund simply because of its relative position. 
These experimental findings further demonstrate that investor decisions
do not necessarily follow the traditional view about rational economic
decision-making (Benartzi and Thaler 2002). When faced with difficult
investment decisions, many individuals cope by defaulting to a simple
rule of thumb, such as avoiding extremes or allocating investments
evenly over the range of available funds. The implications are that plan
sponsors may be implicitly and detrimentally influencing investment
choices through the menu of choices they offer to members (Benartzi and 
Thaler 2002).
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The Problems of Procrastination and Inertia
Much of the prior discussion on investment choice assumes that
individuals have the willpower and self-control to exercise choice.
However, surveys and empirical research suggest that individuals are not
particularly good at dealing with the retirement savings problem.
Relatively few people are confident about planning effectively for
retirement, many underestimate the amount they need to save for
retirement and many delay or avoid the savings decision (Mitchell & 
Utkus 2003). In combination, these reactions contribute to the observed
problems of procrastination and inertia in retirement savings decisions.
Procrastination is evident in the U.S. context of employees’ decisions to
voluntarily join 401(k) pension plans. Where employers automatically
enrol employees in these plans, the number of new members dramatically
increases compared to the relatively low rates of participation when
employees must actively choose to participate (see Madrian & Shea
2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian & Metrick 2002a). Although workers who
have been automatically enrolled may choose to opt out immediately or
later, few choose to do so. Moreover, Choi et al. (2002a) find that over 
two-thirds of new plan participants invest exclusively in the default plan
on commencement of employment with this proportion declining to only
45 percent three years later.
Choi et al.’s (2002a) findings demonstrate that where individuals are free
to choose whether to remain in a pension fund or opt out, few do so, and
a relatively large proportion of those who do not opt out do not change
from the default investment option which the employer nominated at the
time employment commenced. Thus, in this voluntary pension saving
environment, ‘employers have the power to dramatically change patterns
of retirement saving by simply changing the defaults that their employees
face’ (Choi et al. 2002a, p.29).
Procrastination has the tendency to produce inertia in the post-enrolment
decisions of many pensions plan participants. A common finding is that
participants rarely rebalance their investment portfolios after joining
plans (Benartzi & Thaler 2002). For example, Ameriks and Zeldes
(2001) found that over a 10-year period 47 percent of their sample of
TIAA-CREF pension plan participants made no changes to the asset
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allocation of new contributions, and 73 percent made no changes to the
existing allocation of assets in their accounts. Weber (2003) suggests that
such inertia is explained by decision makers wanting to avoid retirement-
related decisions which inherently involve contemplating unpleasant
factors including the negative aspects of aging and ultimate death.
The Australian evidence is consistent with the U.S. experience. Surveys
show that, while 80 percent of superannuation fund members are in funds
which allow members to choose the type of assets in which their
superannuation is invested or offer members a choice of fund managers
(Hely 2004), only about 10 percent exercise that choice (Bowman 2003).
Thus a large proportion of superannuation fund members have their
accounts automatically allocated to their fund’s default investment
option.
In contrast to the U.S. and Australian experiences, the majority (67
percent) of Swedish pension plan members choose their investment
portfolios (Engström & Westerberg 2003). The Swedish system is more
complex and includes a much larger range of investment options than
typical 401(k) plans, and the default option is a government provided
publicly managed mutual fund. The relatively low proportion of
individuals in Sweden not making an active choice runs counter to the 
theory that as the number of choices increases, the likelihood of the 
individual making a choice decreases. Engström and Westerberg (2003)
propose the high choice participation rates may be explained by the
effectiveness of the Swedish government’s comprehensive information
campaign, marketing efforts by fund companies, and considerable media
attention given to the new pension system; they suggest these activities
may have reduced the costs of individuals becoming informed.12
Procrastination and inertia are nevertheless significant problems in
Sweden, with one-third of the entire workforce opting out of making an
active pension investment choice.
12 An alternative explanation proposed by Orszag (2003) is individuals have
informed views on public versus private management through Sweden’s long
tradition of publicly managed pension funds, and individuals’ active choice to
invest privately may reflect their greater faith in the private sector rather than the
public sector to manage pension savings.
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An important implication of procrastination and inertia in retirement plan
design is that consideration needs to be given to important psychological
and economic issues that arise in the selection of default options. First, a 
default provision is likely to be interpreted as implicit advice that many
plan members will mechanically follow. Second, over-optimism about
future income may result in undervaluation of savings. Third, the
tendency of plan participants to prefer the status quo may require the
design of plans that incorporate time-varying default options (Madrian
and Shea 2001; Choi, et al. 2003; Mitchell and Utkus, 2003).
Limitations of Member Education Programs
Given the behavioural problems associated with choice, an important
question is: can member education programs change behaviour
sufficiently to avoid sub-optimal choices? Research evidence indicates
that due to the behavioural issues associated with investment choice and
default options, the benefits of member education programs are limited.
For example, Choi et al. (2002b) survey workers’ attitudes expressed
after having attended an employee education seminar on financial
investment, with actual behavioural changes recorded on company
administrative data systems. Their results reveal a gap between intentions
and specific action to join a plan, boost savings, change existing portfolio
allocations, or change the mix of future contributions. That is, although
many who attend an education program indicate intentions to make
changes to their pension plan savings, very few actually do so. Choi et al.
(2002b, p.71) conclude that although education programs may have a
positive affect on savings behaviour, the improvement is ‘modest at
best’.
There is also the issue of the capacity among all workers to acquire and
maintain the necessary knowledge and skills to make informed
superannuation choices. General literacy problems pose considerable
challenges to any financial education campaign. For example, ABS
statistics cited in the Senate Committee’s report indicate that about 20
percent of Australians aged between 15 and 74 have very poor literacy
skills, and up to six million Australians are likely to experience some
difficulties with reading and understanding printed material encountered
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in daily life (SSCS 2002, pp.21-22). General literacy and numeracy skills
may not be sufficient for making financial decisions in the
superannuation context. Even well-educated fund members find 
superannuation information difficult to understand and are not confident
they have the necessary financial skills to choose an investment strategy 
(Gallery, Gallery & Brown 2000; Brown, Gallery, Gallery & Guest
2004).
While financial literacy problems lead to an inability to make informed
choices, another significant barrier is some members’ unwillingness to
become informed because of the associated costs. These costs include the
cost of becoming informed, the cost of maintaining skills and knowledge
on an ongoing basis to enable continuing monitoring and revisions of
past choices, and the potential costs of making the wrong choice (Brown
et al. 2002). Such costs can be avoided by opting out of making a choice
and accepting the default investment option. This inertia, or member
disengagement from the complex decision-making process, cannot be
readily solved by ‘more’ or ‘better’ education programs.
There is also emerging evidence that, while some superannuation funds
have actively pursued strategies to educate their members in 
superannuation matters, there may be an increasing reluctance to
continue to do so. In a Towers Perrin (2003) survey of 12 of Australia’s
largest superannuation funds, 62 percent indicated the responsibility for
member financial education lies with the individuals themselves, with 46
percent indicating it is the responsibility of the fund. When this latter
result is contrasted with the 2002 survey results where 88 percent of the
respondents indicated the fund should play an active role in educating 
members about investments, a move away from the fund to the
individual seems to be evident (Towers Perrin 2003). However, this
decline in funds’ willingness to educate members is not surprising in
light of 77 percent of respondents citing ‘fiduciary or legal concerns
about offering information and advice’ as a main barrier to providing
financial education to members.
Achieving ‘informed choice’ through eduction is important but over-
emphasised in the current choice debate in Australia. Evidence from
surveys and behavioural research shows many people accept the default
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option and the reasons for this passive choice need to be linked to a 
broader question about motivations and decision-making.
Are Default Options Homogeneous?
If the majority of superannuation fund members’ assets are invested in
the default option, can they expect similar long-term investment return
outcomes? Default options may be perceived as homogeneous in their
characteristics and performance across different superannuation funds,
and accordingly similar outcomes might be expected. However, a closer
examination of a cross-section of the best-performing Australian funds
shows a wide variation in medium-term performance. Tables 1, 2 and 3
present rankings of superannuation funds based on the five-year
performance of their default option to June 2003. Table 1 shows the
performance of the overall top ten funds, of which four are government
funds and three each of corporate and industry funds. The five-year
performance rates of these top ten default options are significantly spread
from the lowest at 7.1 percent to the highest almost doubling that rate at 
13.2 percent. Ceteris paribus, such large differences in investment
performance translate into large differences in the superannuation
benefits of members in each of those funds.
Further disparities in default option performance are evident when the
top ten funds are examined within sectors. Table 2 shows that the five-
year performance of default options in industry funds ranges from a rate
of 6.2 percent to 7.6 percent. While the spread of 1.4 percentage points is
relatively small, it should not be forgotten that these are the best
performing default options in industry funds; the spread among all funds
would be considerably larger. When considering the performance of the
best default options in master trusts (Table3), it is clear superannuation
fund members in this segment face significantly worse investment
performance than their counterparts in industry, corporate or government
superannuation funds.13
13 Fees charged by master trusts are typically higher than those of industry, corporate
or government funds (see Chant and ASFA 2003). Charging higher fees would be
justifiable if the fund is generating higher investment income to achieve higher net 
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Table 1: Best Performing Superannuation Funds in All Segments
Based on the Crediting Rate of the Default Investment Option for 
Five Years to June 2003
Performance
Fund Name & Option Segment
Option
Sector 5 yrs Rank
CTC Staff Superannuation
Fund - Accumulation Corp fund Balanced 13.2% 1
NSW Bookmakers
Superannuation Fund -
Accumulation Corp fund Balanced 12.3% 2
Local Government
Superannuation Scheme (QLD)
- Growth Smoothed Government Growth 8.1% 3
Unilever Super - Balanced Corp fund Balanced 8.1% 4
SA Police - South Aust Police 
Super Fund - New (Lump
Scheme) Scheme Division Government Growth 8.0% 5
Australia Post Superannuation
Scheme - Defined Benefit Government Balanced 7.9% 6
CARE Super - Balanced Option Industry Balanced 7.6% 7
The State Superannuation Fund
- Long-Term Investment
Portfolio Government Balanced 7.6% 8
Catholic Superannuation and 
Retirement Fund - Balanced
Portfolio Industry Balanced 7.4% 9
REST - Core Strategy Industry Balanced 7.1% 10
Source: SelectingSuper accessed at http://www.selectingsuper.com.au
Almost all of the default options listed in the three tables are named
‘balanced’ investment options but, in light of the large differences in 
performance, the risk characteristics across this group vary considerably.
This common terminology illustrates the problem of ‘framing effects’ in
menu design. In their study of investment choices offered by 401(k)
pension plans in the U.S., Elton, Gruber and Blake (2004) find that 62
percent of the plans offer inadequate investment choices, and over a 20-
returns for members, but this is clearly not the case with master trust default
(major balanced) investment options; their fees are higher and net returns are 
lower than funds in other sectors.
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year period this translates into a difference of over 300 percent in the
terminal value of an individual’s retirement benefit. Similarly, the
diverse performance of the best-performing default options indicates a
large number of superannuation fund members face significantly
different terminal superannuation values just because of differences
among their superannuation funds’ default investment option. Just as 
Selnow (2003) suggests that financial fate is often determined from birth,
it seems that, if the present wide variation in default option investment
performance continues, many Australians’ retirement wealth (or 
otherwise) will be determined by the ‘accident’ of working for a
particular employer or in a particular industry.
Table 2: Best Performing Industry Superannuation Funds Based
on the Crediting Rate of the Default Investment Option for 
Five Years to June 2003
Performance
Fund Name & Option Segment
Option
Sector 5 yrs Rank
CARE Super - Balanced Option Industry Balanced 7.6% 1
Catholic Superannuation and 
Retirement Fund - Balanced
Portfolio Industry Balanced 7.4% 2
REST - Core Strategy Industry Balanced 7.1% 3
ARF - Balanced Investment
Plan Industry Growth 7.0% 4
HOST-PLUS - Balanced Plan Industry Balanced 7.0% 5
Meat Industry Employees'
Superannuation Fund -
Accumulation Industry Balanced 7.0% 6
equipsuper - equipselect - 
Growth Industry Balanced 6.9% 7
MTAA - Balanced Industry Balanced 6.5% 8
Australian Meat Industry
Superannuation Trust -
Balanced Option Industry Balanced 6.3% 9
HESTA - Core Pool Industry Growth 6.2% 10
Source: SelectingSuper accessed at http://www.selectingsuper.com.au
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Table 3 :  Best Performing Master Trust Superannuation Funds
Based
on the Crediting Rate of the Default Investment Option or Major
Balanced Option for
Five Years to June 2003
Performance
Fund Name & Option Segment
Option
Sector 5 yrs Rank
AMP SL Secure Portfolio Master trust 
Capital
stable 5.3% 1
NAIO BS National Balanced Master trust Balanced 4.2% 2
Citi CSMT Citigroup Balanced 
Trust Master trust Balanced 4.2% 3
MAP MSP Balanced Pool Master trust Balanced 3.9% 4
Mercer CS Mercer Growth Master trust Balanced 3.6% 5
ING CS ING Managed Growth Master trust Balanced 3.2% 6
Aon MTC Balanced Master trust Balanced 3.1% 7
SMF ES Balanced Master trust Balanced 3.0% 8
State Super PRP Balanced Master trust Balanced 2.9% 9
AMP CS Balanced Direct Master trust Balanced 2.9% 10
Source: SelectingSuper accessed at http://www.selectingsuper.com.au
Conclusion
In light of behavioural research findings it is disconcerting so little 
attention is given to types of choices offered to fund members. Elton,
Gruber and Blake (2004, p. 1) observe:
With all the interest in how investors react given the choices they
are offered, it is surprising that there have been no studies of the 
appropriateness of the decisions that corporations make with
respect to which investment choices to offer plan participants.
In the Australian context, fund trustees determine which investment
options are offered to fund members, and it is these fund trustees who
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also set a default option from the range of alternatives on offer. Given the
pervasiveness of investment choice in superannuation funds and the low
proportion of members making active choices, the role of the default
option has become pivotal in superannuation investment choice.
However, virtually no policy-making attention has been paid to default
investment options.
Policy makers need to urgently address whether and how default
investment options should be regulated. This issue is much broader than
the aspects of default options that have been debated in the context of
fund choice over the past eight years. Superannuation members across
different superannuation funds face significantly different end benefits in 
retirement simply because the fund to which they belong selected Option
A as their default investment, rather than Option B, C, D … or Z. 
Leaving the selection of the default investment option to superannuation
trustees will inevitably lead to inequities among members of different
superannuation funds. Gallery, Gallery and Brown (1996) highlighted the
inequities among members of different superannuation funds at a time
when few funds offered their members investment choice. Having now
moved to a choice environment, those inequities are perpetuated for
those members who either passively or actively opt out of making a 
choice.
Financial education programs may improve workers’ knowledge and
understanding of their superannuation to the extent where some
individuals will commence to make active choices, but education cannot
be a panacea. In a choice environment there will always be a core of 
superannuation fund members who will not make a choice because they
are unable or unwilling to do so. Even if the proportion of passive choice
members was reduced to the same level as Sweden (i.e., one-third), this
proportion still represents a very large number of individuals (totalling
some millions) exposed to the vagaries of the default investment selected
by the trustee of their superannuation fund.
Some regulation would seem necessary to address the inequities and
other problems associated with fund trustees having sole responsibility
for selecting default investment options. However, regulating defaults
could be seen as a double-edged sword: while laws and regulations can
facilitate socially optimum defaults, they may also create avenues for the
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misuse of governmental power (Choi, Laibson, Madrian Metrick 2002b)
or perceptions of unnecessary government interference.
Nevertheless, in the present system where superannuation savings are
mandatory but those savings are managed by the private sector, the
government has an obligation to provide ‘safety net’ protection for those
savings (Gallery et al. 1996), particularly those of members making
passive choice (Brown et al. 2002). During the fund choice debate, the
Senate Committee highlighted the importance of ensuring that default
options adequately protect the interests of those members who are unable
to protect their own long-term interests (SSCS 1998) and the need for
setting minimum standards for default options (SSCSFS 2000). Such
protection and standards are even more crucial in the context of 
investment choice.
Some have argued that setting standards for default options will work
against underlying competitive pressures in the industry (see SSCS
1998). Brown et al. (2002) suggest a possible solution is the
establishment of a government-regulated universal default fund (UDF) to 
cater for members who are unable or unwilling to make informed
choices. While it is recognized this solution is likely to be politically
unpalatable for policy-makers and the superannuation industry alike, a 
UDF nevertheless represents a viable alternative to that of adding more
layers of regulation to an already complex system of privately-managed
superannuation.
Australian policy-makers can look to the experiences in other countries,
such as the Swedish pension system, to evaluate how to best regulate
default options that will result in the best possible retirement outcomes
for all Australians. Whatever the outcome, the process of determining a 
suitable default option model needs to commence immediately.
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